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Postmodernism and the Advertised Life.
In Search for an Ethical Perspective on
Advertising
BERT VAN DE VEN
Der Beitrag beabsichtigt einige Aspekten der Postmoderne in Bezug auf das Phänomen
des von Werbung durchdrungenen Lebens zu verdeutlichen. Es wird argumentiert, dass
Baudrillard’s Theorie der politischen Ökonomie des Zeichens verwendet werden kann,
um zu verstehen wie Werbung funktioniert. Trotzdem gibt diese Theorie keine An-
knüpfungspunkte hinsichtlich der Entwicklung einer kritisch-ethischen Perspektive für
die Werbung. Fruchtbarer sind hingegen die postmodernen Philosophien von Derrida und
Lyotard, die Ingredienzen liefern für ein „Gegengift“ zu einer Kommerzialisierung der
Kultur.
“Postmodern nennen wir bekanntlich die Trostlosigkeit, die man nicht
einmal mehr originell formulieren kann. Die Moderne hat alle Möglich-
keiten, den aufgeklärten Weltverdruß zu formulieren, ausgeschöpft und
uns sogar in den aktuellsten Verstimmungen zum Zitieren verurteilt”
(Sloterdijk 1989: 213).
“(...) the advertised life [is] an emerging mode of being in which
advertising not only occupies every last negotiable public terrain, but in
which it penetrates the cognitive process, invading consciousness to such
a point that one expects and looks for advertising, learns to lead life as
an ad, to think like an advertiser, and even to anticipate and insert
oneself in successful strategies of marketing. The advertised life is not
merely what you see on television, it is what the television sees”
(Vanderbilt 1997: 128-129).
1. Introduction
To begin an article with quotations that give a definition of the terms in
the article’s title could easily be understood as an indication that the author
is infected with the perhaps outmoded peculiarities of the intellectual style
of so-called postmodernism. First, there is the use and opposition of
fragments that seem to miss any meaningful connection. Secondly, the first
quotation is, in this context, self-referential. If this is not an example of the
playfulness and conceit so often associated with postmodernism, what
point is the author trying to make? The answer is twofold. I hesitate to
write about “postmodernism” because of its many different meanings and
because Sloterdijk seems to be right about the non-originality of
formulations of even the most current uneasiness concerning the world.
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This is especially true of the uneasiness that has led to this article: The
suspicion that, nowadays, advertising has become omnipresent to such an
extent, that we, the consumers, form our identities and live our lives to a
great extent by consuming lifestyles. The singularity of the individual seems
to be nothing more than the pseudo-individuality offered to us by mass-
production and mass-consumption (Adorno 1941: 207), as is shown, for
instance, by the Chesterfield campaign which associates originality and
singularity of human beings with smoking mass-produced cigarettes via the
slogan “Be an original”.
Perhaps the human condition in the consumer society should be conceived
of as even worse. In the words of Baudrillard, the consumer society is, in
effect, a system of signs, a code that integrates all individuals and  leaves
neither room for authentic meanings nor for the autonomous subject
(Baudrillard 1970: 26-34, 59-90, 123-139). According to Baudrillard, we live
in an area of appearances. The difference between reality and appearance
has imploded into a diversion without any foundation. Because of this
implosion of authentic meaning, Baudrillard is often called a postmodern
thinker.1
If the proposition of the implosion of the difference between reality and
appearance is an important feature of postmodernism as a theory of
society, then the uneasiness mentioned above concerns the fact that the
human condition is postmodern. However, the writings of certain
postmodern thinkers like, for instance, Lyotard give rise to a different
interpretation of postmodernism, which could be used to develop a critical
ethical perspective on advertising. In this case, the unease concerning the
pseudo-individuality and materialist lifestyles generated by advertising could
be indicative of a growing need for the critical potential of certain
exponents of postmodern thought. In other words, postmodernism could
serve as an antidote to the commercialization of culture, although it has
also been accused of celebrating „a world that has become superficial and
flat when seen through the frame of the TV screen” (Goldman 1992: 228-
231). This article could be read, then, as an attempt to clarify some aspects of the
meaning of postmodernism in relation to the phenomenon of the advertised life, in order to
develop a critical ethical perspective on advertising.
In the second section of this article, Baudrillard’s critique of the economy
of the sign will be elaborated briefly. In the third section, the phenomenon
of the advertised life will be specified to a fuller extent. In the fourth
section, Baudrillard’s proposition of the implosion of the difference
between reality and appearance will be criticized. In the fifth section,
different meanings of the term “postmodernism” will be distinguished in
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order to answer the question whether postmodernism “celebrates” the
advertised life, or offers some ingredients for an antidote to the
commercialization of culture. In the last section the results of this article
will be summarized.
2. The Commodity Sign and Advertising
Baudrillard’s proposition of the implosion of the difference between reality
and appearance seems to hold for the way advertising works. For instance,
what does one buy if one buys a fragrance? A very expensive odor in a
fancy package or a sign value, produced by advertising, to express some
aspect of one’s identity to others and also to oneself? In the latter case, the
sign value determines the economic exchange value of the fragrance. If
there is no difference between what an object seems to be and what it is,
then the only thing that matters is how something is presented, how signs
are attached to the object that differentiate it from other objects.2 The
difference that matters, both from a commercial point of view and from
the point of view of the consumer, is the difference between the sign values
attached to the fragrances A and B via advertising.
The fact that these fragrances smell different is, by contrast, of minor
importance. According to Baudrillard, such differences with respect to the
use value or utility of the product do not make this use value autonomous
(Baudrillard 1981: 130-142). The “pure” odor has no autonomous authentic
value for the individual. The use value is very much a social relation.
Contrary to Marx, this means that the use value of an object should not be
understood as a fixed relation between an authentic human need and a
certain object. Since the consumer does not have access to an authentic
meaning with regard to the product, it makes no sense to criticize the
“falseness” of the meaning attached to products by sign values. The sign
value is the exchange value of the product, whereas the use value is only an
alibi, that is, the use value provides the exchange value with the guarantee
of an objective reality, for which, however, the system of use values
substitutes its own total logic of exchangeability or utility. That is why
Baudrillard calls the use value the ideological completion of the exchange
value.
According to Baudrillard the fields of economy and of signification have a
homological structure that can be summarized with the following formula
(Baudrillard 1981: 143-144):
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EV, Sr / UV, Sd ; with EV = exchange value, Sr = signifier,
    UV = use value, Sd = signified3
In Baudrillard’s opinion ideology should be understood as: “that very form
that traverses both the production of signs and material production - or
rather, it is the logical bifurcation of this form into two terms: EV, Sr / UV,
Sd. This is the functional, strategic split through which the form reproduces
itself. It signifies that ideology lies already whole in the relation of Ev to Uv, that
is, in the logic of the commodity, as is so in the relation of Sr to Sd, i.e., in the
internal logic of the sign” (Baudrillard 1981: S.144). In other words,
ideology ensures that the consumer believes that there is some real use
value related to the exchange value, in the same way in which it ensures that
we think that there is some reality that is signified (Sd) by a signifier (Sr).
According to Baudrillard, however, use value and the signified are not
independent realities to which the systems of exchange values and of
signifiers refer; they are only their alibis. It follows that the separation
between the sign and the world, between exchange value and use value
respectively, is a fiction.
Baudrillard radicalizes the homological structure of the fields of economy
and signification to an equivalence: The (political) economy is understood
as a economy of sign production, as a system of arbitrary relations between
the objects of production and consumption that only exist as signs
(commodity sign). This means that the commodity signs do not possess any
authentic value or identity. They are nothing but the “meaningless”
differences of differences. The commodity sign is nothing but pure form.
There is no reality behind the commodity sign that can be comprehended.
An advertisement of, for instance, the fragrance of Hugo Boss can serve to
illustrate what Baudrillard means. The advertisements shows a young
attractive man and woman, and two bottles of Hugo Boss fragrance, one
for men and one for women. The caption reads “Innovate don’t imitate”.
Through its form the advertisement connects the signifiers “innovation”
and “Hugo Boss fragrance”. The signifier “Hugo Boss fragrance” is
dominant, because we know that any advertisement is eventually trying to
sell something and that the advertisement, therefore, is about a product.
The entire sign “Hugo Boss fragrance” as the dominant signifier, is
transformed into the signifier of another signified “innovation”4. This
means that the “Hugo Boss fragrance” is associated with desirable human
characteristics like “originality” and “being innovative”.
This example illustrates that the commodity sign as a composite of a
signifying unit (a word, a picture, a sound, an object) and a signified
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meaning (a mental image, concept of impression) suggested by a signifier
can be produced by the advertising form. Advertising establishes an exact
correlation between a signifier (the product or company) and a certain
signified meaning. It is important to note that the signified meaning is not
required to be real. In the case of the Hugo Boss fragrance, the signified
meaning of “innovative” is very abstract. What does it mean “to be
innovative” in a general sense? Does is mean something more than that one
should not imitate others? In other words, the advertisement does not
provide for a specific well circumscribed sense of “being innovative”. At
the same time, the advertisements transforms this abstract meaning of
“being innovative” into the signified of the commodity sign that is the
Hugo Boss fragrance. One could conclude, therefore, that in advertising
there is no reality behind the signs. The only difference between fragrance
A and B is that A is associated with, for instance, nature and “being
natural,” whereas fragrance B is associated with “being innovative”. In
Baudrillard's view, this is no reason to criticize advertising, because the
absence of reality (of Sd) is true of all signs and not just of commodity
signs. The  consumer, therefore, can neither refer to what it means for a
human being in different social contexts to be really innovative, nor to the
use value of the fragrance satisfying a real individual need. To really enjoy
the Hugo Boss fragrance is to consume its sign value. This is what
advertising teaches the consumer: to consume signs (Goldman 1992: 39).
Although Baudrillard’s proposition of the implosion of the difference
between reality and appearance seems to hold for the world of advertising,
it does not imply that the difference between reality and appearance has
vanished altogether. In the latter case, it would make no sense to
distinguish between the economic system of sign values and authentic
communication in the lifeworld.5  There would be no resources available
within society to criticize the meanings offered by the system of sign values.
This means that society would totally coincide with the economic system of
sign values, whereas the only roles available to us would be the roles
offered by that same economic system, namely the roles of consumer,
employee, employer, manager, stockholder, and so on. Baudrillard leaves us
without any hope of a critical assessment of the claims that are implicitly or
explicitly made in advertising.
Baudrillard, of course, denies that it makes sense to distinguish between the
lifeworld, where people can communicate in a rational way by the free
acceptance or rejection of each other’s validity claims (Habermas 1981a) on
the one hand, and the economic system of sign values on the other. The
phenomenon of the advertised life seems to confirm this: There is no life
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outside the advertised life. In the next section, we will describe the relation
between the production of commodity signs in advertising and the
advertised life in more detail. This discussion should enable us to answer the
question whether there is an alternative to the advertised life and whether any system of
meaning can be found outside of the economic system of sign values.
3. The Advertised Life
In the production of commodity-signs, the origin of the exchange value lies
in the structure of the communicative exchange set up by ads. According to
Goldman, the advertisement’s mode of address, not necessarily its content,
invites a series of imaginative exchanges between viewers and the
advertisements that position viewers as subjects of the discourse. This
means that viewers must supply the interpretative labor necessary to
assemble sign value (Goldman 1992: 38). Interpreting an ad, constructing
meaning and producing sign values are intertwined processes. Goldman
points out that each task is accomplished in consumer-good ads via
structured interpretative practices of abstraction, equivalency and
reification. This means that the logic of these decoding practices
corresponds to the logic of the commodity form as analyzed by Marx.
Below, we will describe briefly how the logic of the commodity form
corresponds with the way advertisers structure ads.
First, advertisements abstract certain social meanings from the lifeworld of
the viewers and create a new, but fabricated, context in which the
consumption of the product makes sense. Being an original person, for
instance, is meaningful in the context of relations between people, and it
makes sense to a person who values the freedom to live his life the way he
wants to. Chesterfield’s advertisement with the caption “be an original”
abstracts this meaning from the context of the lifeworld, and attaches it to
the consumption of mass-produced cigarettes. The brand “Chesterfield” is
the signifier that refers to an abstracted meaning of “being an original
human being”. Since abstracted relations have been separated from any
genuine personal affectivity, Goldman concludes that the commodity
imparts their subjectivity. Being a unique, original person is not something
that emanates from any individual subject but from the product consumed.
In other words, subjectivity is being treated as a tabula rasa that can be
filled with desired attributes of the products they consume (Goldman 1992:
24).
Secondly, the abstraction of meaning from the lifeworld makes it possible
to establish a system of exchange, because these meanings have become
equivalent and thus interchangeable. The abstracted meanings become
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available for attachment to a variety of things or for use in exchange for a
variety of experiences:
Experiences such as joy, wonder, peace, sexual pleasure and fulfillment are
in turn treated as equivalent in that they, too, are reproducible and
interchangeable. An advertisement for My de Myurgia toilet water shows a
man wearing a black tuxedo embracing a woman dressed in a red, flowing
evening gown. The caption beneath the picture reads: “MY choice to share
with you ... because we have so much in common.” Framed beneath this
caption is a picture of interlocking bottles of toilet water, one labeled “Red
for her” and the other labeled “Black for him”. The ad thus equates the
interlocking of things with the embrace of a man and a woman. The
equivalence expressed in the commodity is transferred to the relationship
between man and woman” (Goldman 1992: 27).
This example illustrates that the advertising form itself functions as a
transformational field within which the currency of interchangeable
equivalents is established and begins to circulate.
Finally, advertisements reify social relations and human characteristics.
Reification is a process in which people forget the part their own activity
has played in producing the social world. According to Goldman, Marx’s
metaphor for commodity fetishism was never more appropriate than here6:
“objects apparently possess human characteristics (“gorgeous, sexy,
young”), while humans only appear to possess the qualities of living, active
beings when they possess (wear) the appropriate corporately made object-
signs” (Goldman 1992: 31). In his article  “The Advertised Life,”
Vanderbilt also refers to commodity fetishism to describe the phenomenon
of the advertised life: “Marx’s famous fetishism of commodities, once
considered a radical notion, is now readily accepted on Madison Avenue
[the center of the advertising business in the United States, B.v.d.V.] as the
modern way to sell products people do not actually need. (...) But as brand
awareness and advertising campaigns become larger than the products
themselves, we increasingly identify our place in society through
advertising” (Vanderbilt 1997: 133).
4. Beyond Baudrillard: A Critical Perspective on Advertising
Is Baudrillard right then, when he asserts that there is no use value, no real
utility to which commodities refer, because advertising teaches us to
consume sign values, not commodities? The answer is yes and no. He is
right in saying that the advertising form produces commodity signs to
increase the exchange value of the commodity by establishing an exact
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correlation between a signifier (the product or company) and a certain
signified meaning. This is only possible thanks to the structured
interpretative practices of abstraction, equivalency and reification as
described above. He is wrong, however, insofar as he thinks that to criticize
the production of sign values is pointless. In precise terms, the
establishment of an exact correlation between a discrete signifier (Sr) and a
signified (Sd) can be criticized quite easily by referring to the meaning(s) of
the signifier in the cultural interpretation frameworks of the lifeworld. That
the advertising form reifies these meanings is exactly the reason that
authors like Goldman and Vanderbilt are critical of the consumer culture.
The fact that this consumer culture encompasses more and more areas of
the lifeworld, from sport to art, from sexuality to the investment hobby of
private individuals and from lifestyles to the use of the Internet, does not
mean that there is no escape from the advertised life. It means that these
areas run the risk of being “colonized” as Goldman asserts (Goldman 1992:
38). This colonization is morally undesirable because it has a dissolving
influence on culture. The shared meanings lose some of their
meaningfulness when they are abstracted and plundered as a resource to
produce commodity-signs. As a consequence, the social integrative function
of these shared meanings is lost.
According to Goldman, equivalence does not destroy but redefines
individuality. He agrees with Adorno, who saw pseudo-individualization as
the other side of the standardization brought about by mass-production
and mass-consumption. The examples of the Chesterfield and Hugo Boss
ads given above illustrate this point: Mass-produced objects are offered as a
means to establish one’s individuality. Contrary to Baudrillard's opinion that
there is no reality behind the system of signs, the notion of pseudo-
individuality leaves open the possibility of a genuine or authentic
individuality. Indeed, its whole significance depends on the assumption of
the possibility of an individuality that is not pseudo, but real. The
commodification of this individuality, then, can be criticized from the
perspective of the lifeworld, that is, the shared meanings and cultural codes
that are developed relatively independently from the production of
commodity signs.
Such a critical perspective, however, becomes increasingly difficult to
develop and to sustain when the lifeworld itself becomes saturated with
commodity-signs. According to Goldman, the success of lifestyle
advertising has led to such a colonization7: “When individuality depends on
how one presents oneself as a work of art, then the circuit of freezing and
packaging experience as ‘commodity aesthetics’ is complete. Lifestyle has
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come to refer to experiences defined by consumption of aesthetically coded
sets of commodified appearances” (Goldman 1992: 30). The equivalence
between lifestyle image and commodity sign makes it possible for the
product to take over the reality on which it was, at first, dependent for its
meaning. As a result, consumers do not know of any other way to prove
that they are leading this or that life than by buying all the commodity signs
that make up a lifestyle.
For the purpose of this article, the most interesting example of the
commodification of culture is the commodification of postmodernism as a
lifestyle or bundle of lifestyles that can be acquired by buying endlessly
varying sets of commodity-signs. In the next section, different meanings of
the term “postmodernism” will be distinguished in order to answer the
question whether postmodernism has turned out to be nothing but another
manifestation of the advertised life, or perhaps offers some ingredients for
an antidote to the commercialization of culture.
5. Postmodernism, the unmanageable difference
According to Goldman, postmodernity is partially a product of the history
of commodity culture: “Advertising dedicated to generating sign values is
routinely grounded in a language disorder, the continuous rerouting of
signifiers and signifieds. Postmodern schizophrenia is the result of undoing
the ties that bind signifiers with signifieds, so they can enter into the
exchange process necessary for assembling commodity-signs. When
abstracted to their logical extremes, advertising’s rudimentary processes of
engineering meaning exchanges - juxtaposition and superimposition - become
the hallmarks of postmodern signification practices. Postmodern aesthetics
are an outgrowth of cultural contradictions generated by the society of the
spectacle, where the commodity form has re-absorbed and incorporated
ideological opposition” (Goldman 1992: 202). Goldman defines
postmodernism as: (i) The loss of unified meaning, the circumstance that
there is no longer a single authoritative interpretation of a text but a
multiplicity of interpretations which lead to a supposed cultural pluralism;
(ii) a loss of certainty because of the breakdown of the grand narratives of
Western Civilization (Goldman 1992: 202, 213). His observation that post-
modernism is partially an outgrowth of advertising that continuously
reroutes signifiers and signifieds, however, is not in line with his analysis of
the way the meaning of postmodernism is commodified in the Reebok
advertisement.
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Goldman demonstrates how Reebok’s postmodern ad turns cultural
critique into a commodity signifier of “the end of desire”. This is
accomplished by denying its “adness,” that is, by encoding a self-reflexive
awareness of its own ad-ness. Furthermore, ambiguity is artificially imposed
on the ad by explicitly rupturing the conventional. Goldman rightly
concludes that certain elements of postmodernism are exploited by
advertising to seek commodity differences: “Reebok’s ambiguity represents
difference - its meaning is defined by that which sets it apart from other
meanings. This is not, however, the radical ambiguity which Derrida
identifies, but ambiguity generated by intentional discontinuity and
suspension of conventional reading rules. Ambiguity has been turned into a
signifier. Though ambiguity masquerades as interpretative openness, it is
turned to a mere second-order signifier of difference” (Goldman 1992:
212). Here, Goldman acknowledges that the radical ambiguity about which
Derrida writes is not the same as the artificial explicit representation of
ambiguity in the Reebok ad. It should, therefore, be possible to criticize the
so-called “postmodernism” of certain advertisements from a genuine
critical (postmodern) perspective. By contrast, Goldman blames
postmodernism for abstracting the culture of appearances from the self-
contradictory relations of advanced capitalism. According to him, that is
why postmodernism, when it makes its way into mass culture, becomes
little more than a fetishized fascination with the image. Finally, cynical
fascination will replace the postmodern critique and self-reflexive
consciousness will materialize as a new form of consumer fetishism
(Goldman 1992: 231).
In opposition to Goldman, I will examine briefly whether a postmodern
perspective is feasible that can serve as, or hint at, an antidote to the
commodification of culture, including the commodification of its own
meaning. First of all, we must conclude that if we call Baudrillard’s theory
of the political economy of the sign “postmodern,” then postmodernism in
this sense does not offer a critical perspective.
The two other meanings of postmodernism, given above in Goldman’s
definition, seem more promising, however. The first meaning concerns the
loss of unified meaning. Goldman refers to Derrida in this context8 (see the
quotation above). Lyotard of course, elaborated the second meaning, the
breakdown of the grand narratives of Western Civilization. Goldman only
mentions this second meaning, but does not elaborate a critique.
With respect to the loss of unified meaning, that is the circumstance that
there is no longer a single authoritative interpretation to a text but a
multiplicity of interpretations, it should be noted that this is also
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problematic from the perspective of the advertiser. No matter how
“postmodern” the ad in question is, the advertiser wants to communicate a
certain preferred interpretation. Such a preferred interpretation can, for
example, be that “the viewer is to clever to be taken in by ads”. If it is true,
however, that the advertiser cannot control the interpretation of the ad, his
efforts to fix the relation between a signifier and a signified will be
counterbalanced by the sheer multiplicity of interpretations and the
continuos possibility of a deviant interpretation. According to Derrida, the
possibility of deviant interpretations is not something accidental to
language, but a condition of its proper functioning (Derrida 1972: 365-393).
This means that the advertiser can only succeed in fixing a preferred
interpretation insofar as misinterpretation is also possible. Furthermore,
according to Derrida, experience and language tend to break adrift, because
the iterability of language leaves open the possibility of clarifying what is
said, or to wrench the words from their context, or to juxtapose
propositions in order to disrupt what is asserted. For instance, the
advertisement of Sprite with the slogan “Image is nothing, thirst is
everything” simply asks to be reversed to: Thirst is nothing, image is
everything. This reversal of the order of the words brings us closer to the
general truth about advertising, namely that in a consumer society
characterized by economic affluence, human needs are by itself not enough
to sell products, one has to sell illusions, that is, commodity signs as they
are created by advertising.
The Sprite example illustrates that advertisers cannot control the
interpretation of their work and that from a commercial perspective a lot of
waste is produced in the minds of viewers. It follows that one should not
be worried too much about advertising colonizing the lifeworld. Of course,
consumers will keep consuming commodity signs, but nothing can prevent
these commodities and their sign value from becoming meaningful in a
different way than was envisaged by the preferred interpretation of the
marketers. The circumstance that a lot of commodity signs reify social
relations and human characteristics does not imply that the consumers of
these commodities are strongly influenced by this reification. In other
words, an advertiser is never sure whether his commodity sign will become
culturally accepted, that is, that the meaning of the commodity sign is
adopted and confirmed by the behavior and judgement of a significant
social group. Because of the iterability of language, the lifeworld is too
unruly to become totally dominated by commercial language. Another
example illustrates this. In the hiphop community, the emblems of certain
cars like Volkswagen and Mercedes were worn as a sign with a meaning
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that is only understandable from within this community. Volkswagen and
Daimler-Chrysler certainly did not encourage this usage of their emblems.
The antidote that Derrida’s theory of the iterability of language hints at
consists, therefore, in this parodying, quoting, free interpreting, and other
forms of repeating the reified and abstracted commodity signs which will
unsettle the preferred interpretation(s) of the marketers. This can but
should not necessarily be done intentionally. The deviation of
interpretations is something that will happen because of the iterability of
language and is not dependent on the efforts of individuals to intentionally
create deviant interpretations. Nevertheless, to serve as an antidote, one
could use the deviating power of language intentionally to counterbalance
an overexposure to advertising.
One could object that to parody and to freely interpret advertisements
implies that one is very much involved with commodity signs and that in
this way the penetration of commodity signs in the lifeworld will only be
furthered. In my opinion, however, nothing is wrong as such with the fact
that commodity signs have become a part of our daily lives, as long as their
meaning and the reason we buy the products is not mainly determined by
advertising. In a completely colonized lifeworld, the meaning of our lives and lifestyles
would be fully determined by advertising. At the same time, the lifeworld would
no longer be distinguishable from the economy at all. The economic system
needs a lifeworld, since it depends on it for the continued production of
commodity signs. If the economic system were to colonize the lifeworld
completely, it would have no raw material to produce new commodity
signs. Complete colonization is therefore inconceivable.
Let us now turn to the second meaning of postmodernism given above, i.e.,
the breakdown of the grand narratives of Western Civilization. With the
term “grand narratives,” Lyotard refers mainly to the philosophies of
history that have been developed since the Enlightenment, especially the
philosophies of Hegel and Marx. Also, the thought that the purpose of
history is the realization of the free market economy or liberal democracy is
an example of a grand narrative. What all these narratives have in common
is a belief in progress. According to Lyotard, one of the connotations of the
postmodern situation is this loss of the belief in progress (Lyotard 1986:
115-116). He thinks that the atrocities of this century have cruelly disrupted
that belief.
Lyotard values the breakdown of the grand narratives positively, because of
their uncritical nature. They do not acknowledge the gap or heterogeneity
between ideas and reality. According to Lyotard, there are different forms
of discourse or genres in a language, such as the genres of economics, law,
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aesthetics, science and ethics (Lyotard, 1983). Each genre has its own
purpose. As a consequence, the genres are heterogeneous, which means
that there is no meta-genre, no rules that can rightly decide which argument is correct if
there is a conflict between the different genres. For example, science cannot prove
that the genre of ethics or aesthetics is nonsense, because there is no meta-
genre with rules to decide which genre is right. It is possible, however, to
have fruitful exchanges between genres. For instance, cultural anthropology,
economics and sociology can inform ethicists about the conditions which
further good behavior, but these sciences cannot answer the normative
question why one should obey moral duties.
According to Lyotard, however, the opposite is often the case. Instead of
peaceful co-existence or fruitful exchange, the genres are at war with each
other. This can lead to a hegemonic position of one of the genres. Lyotard
believes that the economic genre has obtained such a position in capitalist societies
(Lyotard 1988). This hegemony implies that conflicts between the genres
are almost always decided in favor of the economic genre, because only the
rules of this genre decide what is reasonable and desirable. Since the goal of
the economic genre is to win time, other genres that need time to develop
fully become suppressed. This hegemony of the economic genre is
detrimental to justice, because justice depends on the susceptibility of
institutions and persons to the plurality of genres, to ethics and to the voice
that has not been articulated yet. This voice is the voice of the child in each
grown-up that is not able to use the fancy arguments of the calculating
mind of the grown-up. According to Lyotard, childhood leaves traces of
undeterminable difference in the grown-up. This is one of the meanings of
the “inhuman,” because it does not speak the self-confident language of the
grown-up who has internalized the values and interests of civilization
(Lyotard, 1988). At the same time and seen from another perspective,
however, these traces of childhood are pre-eminently human. They are still
present as sensibilities to something that has not arrived yet, that needs
time to occur.
On the basis of our description of the phenomenon of the advertised life,
one could say that advertising is also a genre that has obtained hegemony
over other kinds of genres. With regard to culture, this hegemony means
that culture becomes commodified, packaged and sold as a commodity
sign, since the goal of advertising is to produce and sell sign value. Of
course, there is a close relationship between the economic genre and the
advertising genre. This is recognizable in the production process of
commodity signs: The time that it takes to produce them should not be too
long. Once a commodity sign is established, one should not change the sign
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value as long as it is successful. For instance, in the entertainment industry,
pop artists, and nowadays also classical stars like “the three tenors,” are
created as marketing concepts. When they are successful, record companies
often pressure them to do nothing that could endanger their image. No
matter how boring their music gets, no matter how strongly they want to
explore new musical terrain, they have to do the same trick over and over
again. If an artist is too unruly or too many-sided to produce a univocal
commodity sign, he simply loses his or her contract, unless the artist has
contractually secured his or her artistic freedom.
According to Lyotard, culture needs time to develop. Given time, new
creative thinking and art can develop alongside new institutions that are
susceptible to each other and to the voice that has not been articulated yet.
Although Lyotard himself did not seem optimistic about the possibility of
safeguarding one’s time for the economic imperative of saving time, an
ingredient for the antidote to the commodification of culture can be
derived from his philosophy. This ingredient is to slow down,9 to stop
buying all those books, compact discs, tickets to the film and theatre and so
on, and to start (re)reading and listening (not only to music). Slowing down
also means that one stops trying to keep pace with all the so-called (?)
radical changes of the “new economy,” all its new hypes and products, its
globalization and its flexibilization of work and leisure. Such slowing down
should create time to do something useless, that is, something that has no
apparent utility, such as reading philosophy. Maybe then something will
happen, something will take up space and time that was monopolized by
the imperative to use one’s time efficiently in order to consume as much
commodity signs as possible, or, in the words of Pepsi-Cola the imperative
“To live life to the max”.
6. Summary
In this article, an attempt was made to clarify some aspects of the meaning
of postmodernism in relation to the phenomenon of the advertised life, in
order to develop a critical ethical perspective on advertising. We saw that
Baudrillard thinks that there is no real meaning or use value that can serve
as the basis for the critique of commodity signs. Postmodernism in the
sense of Baudrillard’s theory of the political economy of the sign, therefore,
does not provide us with a critical perspective on advertising. Contrary to
Baudrillard, we conclude that it makes sense to distinguish a lifeworld, with
shared meanings and cultural codes that have developed relatively
independently of the production of commodity signs, from the economic
system. This leaves open the possibility of criticizing the commodification
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of culture. Furthermore, two other meanings of postmodernism proved to
be fruitful to the development of a critical perspective on advertising.
Derrida’s theory of the iterability of language offers an antidote to the
commodification of culture, since the deviating power of language can be
intentionally used to unsettle the preferred interpretations that advertisers
are so eager to communicate. Lyotard’s philosophy also offers a possible
ingredient for an antidote, namely to slow down. The meaning of this
ingredient, however, is only touched upon in this article. Some questions
still have to be formulated and answered. To conclude this article, I can
only give an indication of the question that forces itself upon me: Can we
decide to slow down? Is it within the power of humans to withdraw from
the overpowering forces of Western Civilization?10
                                                     
1 Baudrillard himself presumably would not agree with this label, because he sees
postmodernism as another attempt to establish a certain meaningful unity into the
diversity of cultural forms, whereas he rejects such unifying meanings (Van Gils 1986:
64).
2 Compare Lyotard with respect to his remarks about the loss of the object (Lyotard 1993:
33)
3 The distinction between signifier and signified as the two components of the sign is
derived from the work of Saussure (Saussure 1972)
4 Baudrillard calls this a staggered scheme of connotation (Baudrillard 1981: 157).
5 The concept of the lifeworld is taken from Jürgen Habermas. With the concept of the
lifeworld, Habermas elucidates the social embeddedness of communication, that is, its
dependence on cultural interpretation frameworks that are largely given to those who
engage in communicative action (Habermas 1981b).
6 It should be noted though that Marx’s theory of fetishism refers to the social origin of
commodities in abstract labor and not to the social origin of meaning.
7 A good example of a colonization of meanings from the lifeworld, is the
commodification of youth culture like the grunge rock scene and hiphop culture in the
90s of the last century (Frank/Weiland 1997: 143-163).
8 Derrida probably would not see himself as a postmodernist thinker. The label “post-
modern” is often used to refer to different kinds of philosophies that have in common
that they emphasize the meaning of differences (between sexes, language games, within
the economy and so on). Postmodern philosophy can be understood as a form of
philosophy of difference. Derrida’s philosophy of difference can be characterized as a
form of poststructuralism, which means a philosophy that is based on the structuralism
of Saussure and that radicalizes this theoretical position (Berns 1998: 25)
9 There is an interesting parallel here with Sloterdijk’s interpretation of Heidegger's
concepts of “Gelassenheit” and “Kehre” as a relaxation of the subject (Sloterdijk, 1989:
203). Elsewhere, Sloterdijk refers to postmodern therapies to slow down which are
supposed to counterbalance the inhuman velocity of money and media operations.
According to Sloterdijk, however, these therapies are still “weltfromm,” that is to say that
they do not really counterbalance what he calls the permanent mobilization of mankind
by Western Civilization (Sloterdijk 1993: 108).
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10 Sloterdijk is skeptical about the will that wants it own relaxation or that wants to “Go
slow” (See also endnote 9).
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